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INTRODUCTION
In re Anschuetz & Co.1 marked the first time a federal court of ap-
peals ruled on the Hague Evidence Convention2 procedures for taking
evidence from a foreign party. The essential question was whether a
German national, as a party before the court, was subject to the broad
* J.D., 1987, Washington College of Law, The American University.
1. In re Anschuetz & Co., 754 F.2d 602, 608 (5th Cir.), petition for cert. filed sub.
nom. Anschuetz & Co. v. Mississippi River Bridge Auth., 106 S. Ct. 52 (1985).
2. The Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commer-
cial Matters, opened for signature March 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, T.I.AS. No.
7444, 847 U.N.T.S. 231 [hereinafter Convention]. A lengthy discussion of procedures
under the Convention is beyond the scope of this paper. See generally Note, Taking
Evidence Outside the United States, 55 B.U.L. REv. 368 (1975) (discussing Conven-
tion procedures in greater detail).
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discovery provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or
whether, as a national of a signatory to the Convention, was subject to
the more limited Convention procedures. 3 The Fifth Circuit held that
absent one very narrow exception, the foreign party was subject to dis-
covery under the Federal Rules."
This Note details the substantial split in opinion among state and
federal courts prior to the Anschuetz decision regarding the applicabil-
ity of the Convention to foreign signatory nationals. Since the decision
in Anschuetz, however, every state and federal court presented with
this issue has followed the reasoning of the Fifth Circuit.0 This Note
postulates reasons why this trend will continue.
The Note then examines the court's analysis in Anschuetz and con-
cludes that despite an evaluation of the available alternatives, the hold-
ing is subject to attack for not fully considering the sovereign interests
of the Federal Republic of Germany. Furthermore, the note concludes
that the Fifth Circuit superficially examined ordering first resort to the
Convention in attempting to satisfy the conflicting interests involved.
Finally, the Note offers a proposal articulating circumstances when a
court should order first resort to Convention procedures.
I. PRIOR HISTORY
A. THE SITUATION PRIOR TO THE CONVENTION
Prior to the adoption of the Hague Evidence Convention, procedures
for taking evidence abroad were chaotic.6 These procedures were often
discretionary and subject to a myriad of obstacles.7 The result was that
both foreign and United States courts consistently did not receive ade-
quate assistance from, or dispense adequate aid to, litigants in other
3. In re Anschuetz & Co., 754 F.2d 602, 604-05 (5th Cir.), petiton for cert. filed
sub. nom. Anschuetz & Co. v. Mississippi River Bridge Auth., 106 S. Ct. 52 (1985).
4. Id. at 615.
5. See infra note 152 (adumbrating cases).
6. See Jones, International Judicial Assistance: Procedural Chaos and a Program
for Reform, 62 YALE L.J. 515 (1953) (discussing taking evidence, service of process
and obtaining information on foreign law prior to the Convention); Taking Evidence by
Deposition and Letters Rogatory and Obtaining Documents in Foreign Territory, ABA
SECTION OF INT'L & COMP. LAW PROCEEDINGS 37, 46-69 (1959) (discussing the prac-
tical problems and substantial expenses involved in taking evidence abroad); Note, Ob-
taining Testimony Outside the United States: Problem for the California Practitioner,
29 HASTINGS L.J. 1237 (1978) (discussing the procedural and evidentiary problems
facing the international litigant).
7. See generally I B. RISTAU, INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE (CIVIL AND
COMMERCIAL) 14-117 (1984) [hereinafter B. RISTAU] (describing means by which





Attempts on the part of the United States to enter into treaties for
international judicial cooperation met with limited success.0 Foreign
governments generally permitted American attorneys to depose only
United States citizens within their territorial limits.10 Document pro-
duction was substantially limited as well." Ignorance of the practice
and purpose of United States discovery procedures was principally re-
sponsible for foreign hostility to United States evidence gathering
methods.1
2
Due to the general lack of a coordinating agreement, a litigant seek-
ing evidence in a state prohibiting United States style discovery prac-
tice,' 3 or in a state where the witness was unwilling or legally unable1 4
to give evidence, was required to resort to the cumbersome, dilatory,
and inefficient letter rogatory.15 Success with this procedure required
8. Jones, supra note 6, at 516, 518-34. See generally P. DYER-SMITH, FEDERAL
EXAMINATIONS BEFORE TRIAL AND DEPOSITIONS PRACTICE §§ 602-810 (1939) (dis-
cussing means by which United States litigants can obtain evidence abroad).
Civil law states have taken steps toward remedying these problems through a com-
prehensive series of treaties assuring judicial assistance. Jones, supra note 6, at 516.
9. See generally A. STERN, GETTING THE EVIDENCE (1936) (containing informa-
tion on twenty-three countries); Jones, supra note 6, at 523-29 (examining the results
of United States efforts in this area).
10. P. DYER-SMITH, supra note 8, at §§ 602-810; Jones, supra note 6, at 523-25;
see Heilpern, Procuring Evidence Abroad, 14 TULANE L. REV. 29, 40 (1939) (discuss-
ing the difficulties involved in securing evidence abroad). Heilpern states that the diffi-
culties surrounding the securing of evidence abroad are such as to confound any gen-
eral practitioner not experienced in such matters. Id. Even to one who has the
necessary experience, the delays and red tape involved in an effort to secure such evi-
dence create a formidable psychological barrier in the prosecution of a litigation. Id.:
see also Note, Foreign Depositions Practice in American Civil Suits - A Judicial
Stepchild, 96 U. PA. L. REV. 241 (1947) (discussing the lack of formal procedures for
importing testimony).
11. See generally Eder, Powers of Attorney in International Practice, 98 U. PA. L.
REV. 840 (1950) (discussing problems with taking evidence abroad).
12. See Jones, supra note 6, at 526-28 (discussing various reasons for hostility).
13. See id. at 520-21 (describing a 1949 incident in Switzerland as illustrating the
problem in attempting to take evidence without resort to the letters rogatory). Three
Dutch attorneys took evidence from a Dutch citizen in Switzerland who had filed suit
against the Dutch government. Id. After questioning, the Dutch citizen signed a copy
of his oral responses. The Dutch lawyers were subsequently arrested and jailed,
charged with usurping sovereign functions of the Swiss government. Id.
14. Id. at 528 n.8. Foreign local law often prohibits a witness from testifying other
than before a domestic court. See Borel & Boyd, Opportunities for and Obstacles to
Obtaining Evidence in France for Use in Litigation in the United States, 13 INT'L
LAW. 35, 36-37 (1979) (examining in particular the various modes of providing evi-
dence in France); Shemanski, Obtaining Evidence in the Federal Republic of Ger-
many: The Impact of the Hague Evidence Convention on German-American Judicial
Cooperation, 17 INT'L LAw. 465, 466-68 (1983) (describing the Convention's effect on
gathering evidence in the Federal Republic of Germany).
15. Jones, supra note 6, at 529-30. Letters rogatory passed through "as many as a
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the cooperation of the receiving state, which in turn depended on indef-
inite principles of comity and reciprocity."8 Unfortunately, the tension
attributable to the basic differences between United States and foreign
concepts of discovery often undermined successful extraterritorial evi-
dence gathering.17 As a result of years of frustration with this grossly
inadequate process, the United States delegation to the Hague Confer-
ence on Private International Law actively participated in drafting the
Hague Convention on Taking Evidence Abroad. 8
B. THE HAGUE EVIDENCE CONVENTION
The Hague Evidence Convention resulted from the work of a mul-
tinational drafting and negotiating commission at the Eleventh Session
of the Hague Conference on Private International Law, held October
dozen offices in their long journey to the foreign court and home again with an oppor-
tunity for delay or loss at each stop." Id. The authentication of letters rogatory pro-
ceeded as follows:
American letters rogatory are issued in the name of the President of the United
States by the presiding justice of the court and are signed by the clerk. One of
the judges of the court signs and certifies that the clerk is really the clerk of the
court; the Attorney General of the United States certifies that the judge belongs
to the court issuing the letters; the Secretary of State legalized the signature of
the Attorney General; and finally, the Secretary of the Legation of the United
States in the country of the court of execution authenticates the signature of the
Secretary of State [before it is acted upon by the foreign court].
Id. at 529 n.41; see 4 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE D 8.05 (2d ed. 1950) (providing a
form for a letter rogatory); see also Von Mehren, Discovery Abroad: The Perspective
of the Private Practitioner, 16 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 985 (1984) (explaining that
American ideas are aimed at a more rational and less adversarial approach towards
discovery abroad); Amram, The United States Ratification of the Hague Convention
on Taking Evidence Abroad, 67 AM. J. INT'L L. 104, 106-07 (1973) [hereinafter U.S.
Ratification] (discussing the difficulties of requiring the jurisdiction to use compulsion
even if accepted).
16. See infra notes 24, 33, 40, 57-61, 87, 135 and accompanying text (describing
comity as a consideration in ordering resort to the Convention).
17. Goldstein, A Short History of Discovery, 10 ANGLO-AM. L. REv. 257, 257-301
(1981) (describing the differences in discovery among common law countries); Eagles,
Disclosure of Material Obtained on Discovery, 47 MOD. L. REv. 284, 284-88 (1984)
(discussing European attitudes toward U.S. discovery). "Pre-trial disclosure as known
in common law countries, and especially as known in the U.S., is unheard of" in civil
law countries. PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, Extraterritorial Discovery in International
Litigation 27 (1984).
18. Letter of Submittal of Secretary of State William P. Rogers to the President
Regarding the Evidence Convention, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972), reprinted in 12
I.L.M. 324 (1973) [hereinafter Letter of Submittal]; see also Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations of the Evidence Convention, S. REP. No. 25, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 1(1972), [hereinafter Senate Committee on Foreign Relations] (recommending that the
Senate consent to ratification). See generally Amram, The Proposed Convention on the
Taking of Evidence Abroad, 55 A.B.A. J. 651 (1969) [hereinafter Amram] (describing




7-26, 1968.19 The primary goal of the Convention was the continuing
revision of Chapter II of the Hague Conventions on Civil Procedure of
1905 and 1954.20 The Evidence Convention's development was initiated
at the suggestion of the United States Department of State,21 and the
United States played a leading role among the twenty-five nations
drafting the Convention.22
In an effort to deal effectively with the problems of obtaining evi-
dence abroad, the drafters proposed to fill "the need for an effective
international agreement to set up a model system to bridge differences
between the common law and civil law approaches to the taking of evi-
dence abroad,'23 and to replace the imprecise concepts of comity and
19. Pub. L. No. 88-244, 77 Stat. 775 (1963); Message From the President Trans-
mitting to the Senate the Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or
Commercial Matters, SEN. EXEC. Doc. No. A., 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972), reprinted
in 12 I.L.M. 323 (1973) [hereinafter Message from the President]. The President's
transmission to the Senate included both the Report of the Secretary of State and the
Convention Rapporteur's Report. Id.
The Hague Evidence Convention followed the Hague Convention on the Service
Abroad of Judicial and Extra-Judicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters,
done Nov. 15, 1965, 20 U.S.T. 361, T.I.A.S. No. 6638, 658 U.N.T.S. 163 [hereinafter
Hague Documents Convention]. The Hague Documents Convention was undertaken as
a comprehensive revision of Chapter I of the Hague Civil Procedure of 1954, which
superseded the Hague Civil Procedure Convention of 1905, both of which were adopted
before the United States joined the Hague Conference on Private International Law.
See U.S. Ratification, supra note 15, at 1104 (specifically discussing the provisions of
the Convention); Note, The Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad In
Civil or Commercial Matters-A Comparison with Federal Rules Procedures, 7
BROOKLYN J. IlNr'L L. 365, 367 (1981) (describing the Convention's history).
20. B. RisTAu, supra note 7, at 177. Chapter I of these Conventions discussed ser-
vice abroad and resulted in the "Hague Service Convention." Convention on the Ser-
vice Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil and Commercial Mat-
ters, done at the Hague, Nov. 15, 1965, 20 U.S.T. 361, T.I.A.S. 6638, 658 U.N.T.S.
163 (entered into force for the United States Feb. 10, 1969).
21. Amram, supra note 18, at 104. With the success of the Documents Convention,
the State Department recommended the Conference also revise Chapter II of the 1954
Hague Convention on Private International Law dealing with taking evidence abroad.
Letter of Submittal, supra note 18, at 324. Every four years a session is held to draft
conventions on various subjects in the area of private international law. See Radvan,
The Hague Convention on Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Mat-
ters, 16 N.Y.U. J. IN' L. & POL. 1031, 1031 n.2 (1984) [hereinafter Radvan] (fo-
cusing on problems concerning the interpretation of the Convention's provisions, the
position of the Convention within the United States, and the compulsion of discovery if
the Convention fails to serve its intended purpose).
22. Report of U.S. Delegation to the Eleventh Session of the Hague Conference on
Private International Law, 8 I.L.M. 785 (1969) [hereinafter 1969 Report of the US.
Delegation]. Philip W. Amram, who represented the United States on the Special
Commission, was elected rapporteur of the Hague Evidence Convention. Id. at 805; see
Amram, supra note 18, at 652 (describing the United States delegation's role in the
development of the Hague Convention).
23. Letter of Submittal, supra note 18. The preamble to the Convention states, in
part:
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reciprocity with an international treaty.24 A guiding principle that all
parties seemingly adopted throughout the drafting process was the cre-
ation of a method of taking evidence that was both "tolerable" to the
state where it is taken and "utilizable" to the forum state.25 The Con-
vention is presently in force in seventeen states, and many of the signa-
tories are major trading partners with the United States. 6
C. JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF THE HAGUE EVIDENCE CONVENTION
Although the Convention has been in force in the United States since
1972, only a relatively small body of case law27 exists interpreting the
The states signatory to the present Convention, Desiring to facilitate the trans-
mission and execution of Letter of Request and to further the accommodation of
the different methods which they use for this purpose, Desiring to improve mu-
tual judicial co-operation in civil or commercial matters, Have resolved to con-
clude a Convention to this effect[.J
Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 2, at preamble.
24. Augustine, Obtaining International Judicial Assistance Under the Federal
Rules and the Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil and
Commercial Matters: An Exposition of the Procedures and a Practical Example In re
Westinghouse Uranium Contract Litigation, 10 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 101, 120-23
(1980) [hereinafter Augustine].
The act of taking evidence in a common-law country without compulsion and
without a breach of the peace, in aid of a foreign proceeding, is a purely private
matter, in which the host country has no interest and in which its judicial au-
thorities have normally no wish to participate. To the contrary, the same act in a
civil-law country may be a public matter, and may constitute the performance of
a public judicial act by an unauthorized foreign person. It may violate the 'judi-
cial sovereignty' of the host country, unless its authorities participate or give
their consent.
1969 Report of the U.S. Delegation, supra note 22, at 806. Evidence taking between
common law countries has also been contentious. See Comment, The Hague Conven-
tion on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil and Commercial Matters: The Exclu-
sive and Mandatory Procedures for Discovery Abroad, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1461, 1464
n.8 (1984) [hereinafter Mandatory Procedures] (discussing Anglo-American differ-
ences regarding evidence taking).
25. Letter of Submittal, supra note 18, at 6, 13 I.L.M. at 324; see Amram, supra
note 18, at 651 (stating that the Convention should be a workable instrument).
26. Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, Great
Britain, Greece, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Northern Ire-
land, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Arab Republic,
United States and Yugoslavia are signatories to the Evidence Convention. Barbados,
Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany, Finland, France,
Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, Sweden, the
United Kingdom (including the possessions of Hong Kong, Gibraltar, areas of Akrotiri
and Dhekelia on the island of Cyprus, and the Falkland Islands), and the United
States, including Guam, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands ratified the Convention. 7
MARTINDALE-HUBBLE LAW DIRECTORY 14-15 (1986); see Sandman, Gathering Evi-
dence Abroad: The Hague Evidence Convention Revisited, 16 LEGAL PROBS. INT'L
Bus. 963, 974 (1984) (discussing membership in the Convention).
27. With international trade increasing, particularly with the importation of foreign
goods into this country raising the number of possible suits by United States citizens,
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Hague Convention.28 One possible reason for this result is that only six
other nation-states had ratified the Convention as of 1980.20 Further-
more, most American lawyers are relatively unfamiliar with the Con-
vention's provisions, especially in comparison to their familiarity with
local, state, and Federal Rules of Procedure."0
When the Hague Evidence Convention is deemed applicable, courts
have applied it in one of four ways. One set of rulings states Conven-
tion procedures are the exclusive means of conducting discovery
abroad."- Another set of rules provides that litigants must initially em-
ploy Convention procedures before resorting to applicable civil rules. 2
and the addition of signatory states (Japan, Greece, Turkey, Spain and Canada are all
still considering ratification), the number of suits in this area could increase
dramatically.
28. Petitioner's Brief at 9, Anschuetz & Co. v. Mississippi River Bridge Auth.,
petition for cert. filed, 106 S. Ct. 52 (1985) [hereinafter Petitioner's Brief]. Most dis-
covery orders are never published because they are interlocutory in nature and there-
fore not appealable. Id. Counsel for petitioner in Anschuetz estimated that there are
1,500 cases pending in United States courts in which German companies are parties
and in which the discovery of foreign evidence is at issue. Id.
29. Augustine, supra note 24, at 121 n.104. Seventeen states have ratified the Evi-
dence Convention. See 7 MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW DIRECTORY 14-15 (1986) (list-
ing parties).
30. See Newman & Burrows, Discovery Abroad - The Hague Convention,
N.Y.L.J., April 23, 1985, at 1, col. I (discussing how this factor will quickly fade as
the utility of the Convention becomes popularized); see also N.Y.LU., March 8. 1985,
at 1, col. 2 (discussing the use of the Convention in a local state case).
31. Cuisinarts, Inc. v. Robot Coupe, No. CV 80 0050083 (Conn. Super. Ct. July
22, 1982) (on LEXIS) (memorandum of decision on motion for disclosure from a for-
eign corporation under the Hague Convention). The court reasoned that:
[t]he ratification of the Convention brings to a climax years of efforts in the
United States by those interested in modernizing and improving international
and judicial assistance. Neither in the language of the Convention itself nor in
any official communique regarding the effect of the Convention is there any indi-
cation that the U.S. Delegation[,] or any other party to the Convention viewed
the Document as optional in nature.
Id.
Other court decisions deem the Convention to be exclusive. Vorthington v. Polymer
Machinery Corp., No. 83-2131 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 12, 1984); Rockwell Int'l Corp. v. Con-
struzioni Aeronautiche Giovanni Augusta, S.P.A., No. 81-3984 (E.D. Pa. May 17,
1983) (order reversing order of Mar. 21, 1982); Cannon v. Arburg Maschinenfabrik,
No. 80 L 2275 (I11. Cir. Ct. July 21, 1983); Kantor v. Cycles Peugeot, SA., No. 81-
0423 (D.R.I. Apr. 14, 1982) (memorandum and order); Langhans v. Johns-Manville
Sales Corp., No. 535530-7 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 25, 1981) (minute order); Croxton v.
Johns-Manville Sales Corp., No. L-6001079 (N.J. Super. CL May 20, 1980); see Com-
ment, Mandatory Procedures, supra note 23, at 475-85 (concluding that only Conven-
tion procedures should be used to employ discovery abroad).
32. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Superior Court, 123 Cal. App. 3d 840,
176 Cal. Rptr. 874 (1981) (ruling first on the interplay of the Convention with domes-
tic civil rules). The court overturned the trial court's discovery order which required,
inter alia, that the plaintiff be allowed to inspect the defendant's premises and copy
relevant documents in its technical library, conduct informal interviews with and take
depositions of defendant's employees at its plant; all these activities to take place in
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A third series of holdings do not require use of Convention procedures,
however, comity considerations may dictate resort to the Convention in
the particular case.$$ Finally, some courts have held that Convention
Germany. The court of appeals stated:
[W]e stress that we do not question the jurisdiction of the trial court to order
Volkswagenwerk, as a party to the lawsuit before it, to give discovery in West
Germany. With the qualifications we have stated under California law, the or-
ders are appropriate to the action and VWAG is legitimately subject to the or-
ders. We conclude only that the trial court, in the exercise of judicial restraint
based on international comity, should have declined to proceed other than under
the Hague Evidence Convention at this stage.
Id. at 858.
In Pierburg GmbH & Co. KG v. Superior Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d 238, 186 Cal.
Rptr. 876 (1982), involving another attempted discovery of a German corporation, a
different panel of the California Court of Appeals reached the same result. In that case
the plaintiff served written interrogatories on the defendant, who objected that they
were not in conformity with the Hague Evidence Convention. Plaintiffs made no effort
to serve their interrogatories in compliance with the Convention, claiming they could
not afford to translate all 315 interrogatories into German as required by the Conven-
tion. Id. at 241, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 878.
The court in Pierburg agreed with the court in Volkswagenwerk by stating a "Cali-
fornia court should require litigants seeking such discovery to first attempt to comply
with the Convention before allowing the litigant to disregard it." Id. at 240, 186 Cal.
Rptr. at 877. The court also ruled that a party cannot waive its right to insist that
discovery proceed, at least initially, under the Hague Evidence Convention by failing to
insist on compliance as to prior discovery by other parties to the action. Id. at 244, 186
Cal. Rptr. at 881.
Every subsequent reported case by a state appellate court also required at least ini-
tial use of Convention procedures. See Gebr. Eickhoff Maschinenfabrick Und
Eisengieberei v. Starcher, 328 S.E.2d 492, 504-06 (W. Va. 1985) (holding a suit for
damages under strict liability for severance of plaintiff's arm while operating defend-
ant's machine that principles of international comity require use of Convention proce-
dures until such attempts prove useless); Th. Goldschmidt A.G. v. Smith, 676 S.W.2d
443, 447-49 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984) (ruling in a contract suit by an American corpora-
tion against a German corporation that court order requiring deposition be taken in
West Germany of German nationals was improper absent an initial attempt under the
terms of the Convention); Vincent v. Ateliers de ]a Motobecane, 193 N.J. Super. 716,
721, 475 A.2d 686, 690 (1984) (holding in tort action against French manufacturer of
mopeds that plaintiffs were required to initially go through proper diplomatic channels
via Convention procedures).
Several federal district courts also required initial use of Convention procedures. See
General Electric Co. v. North Star Int'l, Inc., No. 83 C 0838 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 21, 1984)(on LEXIS) (memorandum opinion in a contract action ordering use of Convention
procedures as a first resort where documents sought are all located in West Germany);
Schroeder v. Lufthansa German Airlines, 18 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,222, 17,224 (N.D. Ill.
Sept. 15, 1983) (memorandum opinion in a tort action requiring first resort to Conven-
tion procedures where interrogatories will be answered by a German national residing
in Germany); Philadelphia Gear Corp. v. American Pfauter Corp., 100 F.R.D. 58, 61(E.D. Pa. 1983) (plaintiff's document and interrogatory request in a tort action requir-
ing the production of documents from West Germany must first employ Convention
procedures).
33. This is the position adopted by the Fifth Circuit in both In re Anschuetz, 754
F.2d 602, 614 (5th Cir.), petition for cert. filed sub. nom. Anschuetz & Co. v. Missis-
sippi River Bridge Auth., 106 S. Ct. 52 (1985), and In re Messerschmitt Bolkow
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procedures are never required.- It is worth noting, however, that the
United States Supreme Court has yet to decide35 this issue"0 and, con-
Blohm, 757 F.2d 729, 732 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 1633 (1986). In a
recent decision, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals adopted the rationale and holding
of the Fifth Circuit. In re Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale, 782 F.2d 120
(8th Cir.), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 2888 (1986). On a petition for writ of mandamus
in a products liability action, the Eighth Circuit adopted the Anschuetz rationale that
requiring initial use of Convention procedures while reserving the right to order the
discovery if that attempt proved unsuccessful was "a [general] policy [that] would de-
feat rather than promote international comity." Id. at 126.
Prior to Anschuetz, many district courts adopted this position. See Cooper Indus-
tries, Inc. v. British Aerospace, Inc., 102 F.R.D. 918, 921 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (holding
that despite fact documents located in Britain, comity considerations do not require use
of Convention procedures); International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee,
105 F.R.D. 435, 450 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (labeling the conflict between German sover-
eignty and American discovery as "hypothetical"); Adidas, Ltd. v. SS Seatrain Ben-
nington, Nos. 80 Civ. 1911, 82 Civ. 0375, slip op. (S.D.N.Y. May 30, 1984) (on
LEXIS) (holding there is no conflict between the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
the Convention, as the purpose of the Convention was to resolve disputes between civil
law and common law countries over the gathering of evidence abroad).
Lasky v. Continental Products Corp., 569 F. Supp. 1227 (E.D. Pa. 1983) was the
first reported federal decision resolving a conflict between the Hague Evidence Conven-
tion and the Federal Rules. After deciding the Rules do not necessarily conflict with
Convention procedures, the court prophetically stated that comity considerations will
sometimes prove more appropriate. Id. at 1228-29. The district court ruled that be-
cause the requested documents were located in Germany, first resort to the Federal
Rules would be "inappropriate." Id. at 1229; see also Murphy v. Reifenhauser K.G.
Maschinenfabrik, 101 F.R.D. 360, 363-65 (D. Vt. 1984) (adopting this view); Oxman,
The Choice Between Direct Discovery and Other Means of Obtaining Evidence
Abroad: The Impact of the Hague Evidence Convention, 37 U. MIAu L. REv. 773,
779-94 (1983) [hereinafter Oxman] (adopting the position that initial resort should be
to the Convention).
34. Volkswagenwerk A.G. v. Falzon, No. 77-722-371 NP (Mich. Cir. Ct. Oct. 7,
1980) (permitting plaintiffs to take depositions of German citizens in the Federal Re-
public of Germany). This, however, was not a case deciding the interplay of the Con-
vention with the Federal Rules.
35. See generally Volkswagenwerk A.G. v. Falzon, 461 U.S. 1303 (1983) (provid-
ing an insight into how at least two members of the Court would decide if presented
with a conflict between the Convention and the Federal Rules).
Over defendants' objections, Justice O'Connor granted a stay of a state court order
permitting plaintiffs to take depositions of German citizens in Germany. Justice
O'Connor stated that such action would violate the Hague Evidence Convention. Id.
In an earlier proceeding in the same case Chief Justice Burger granted a stay pend-
ing disposition of plaintiff's application for leave to appeal the discovery order before
the Michigan Supreme Court. Id. at 1303-04. Justice O'Connor reasoned that the
Chief Justice "must have concluded that there was a substantial chance that the four
Justices would agree to consider the case on merits, that there was a significant chance
that the applicant would prevail, and that the injury resulting from the denial of a stay
would be irreparable." Id. at 1304 (emphasis added). Justice O'Connor then granted
the stay pending disposition of the application for a stay before the Supreme Court of
Michigan. Id.
Therefore, by implication, Justice O'Connor interprets the significance of the initial
stay, granted by the Chief Justice, as indicating that the Chief Justice believes at least
four other members of the Court would join him in ruling the Hague Evidence Conven-
tion must be followed when seeking discovery of a foreign national. But see Club
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sequently, considerable divergence in judicial opinion exists.
Courts consider nine principal factors in formulating their positions
on the proper application of the Convention's provisions. The first and
most important factor is the protection of the court's jurisdictional
powers. The court in Graco, Inc. v. Kremlin, Inc. stated:
The solicitude for the judicial sovereignty of civil law countries shown in Schroe-
der, Philadelphia Gear and Pierburg apparently is unmatched by any recogni-
tion that they are suggesting a startling limitation on the sovereign powers of this
country, as expressed through its courts. Treating the Convention procedures as
exclusive would make foreign authorities the final arbiters of what evidence may
be taken from their nationals, even when those nationals are parties properly
within the jurisdiction of an American court.s7
It is no coincidence that the same courts making this argument are
least receptive to ordering use of Convention procedures.38 Nearly
every other court, including those that require use of Convention proce-
dures in the first instance, state judicial authority extends to ordering a
party to respond to discovery requests whether the party resides in this
country or abroad."9 Courts favoring resort to the Convention minimize
the threat of the importance of the jurisdictional threat.40
The second factor courts consider is the delay involved in using Con-
vention procedures.41 This factor becomes particularly pertinent when
the Convention is raised subsequent to the commencement of discov-
Mediterranee, S.A. v. Dorin, 93 A.D. 2d 1007 (N.Y.S.2d), appeal dismissed and cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 913 (1984) (dismissing for lack of jurisdiction a case dealing with the
interplay of the Hague Convention with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1984).
36. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in two cases; In re Messerschmidt
Bolkow Blohm, 757 F.2d 729 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 1633 (1986); In
re Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale, 782 F.2d 120 (8th Cir.), cert. granted,
106 S. Ct. 2888 (1986).
37. Graco, Inc. v. Kremlin, Inc., 101 F.R.D. 503, 522 (N.D. Ul1. 1984); see gener-
ally Note, Extraterritorial Discovery, 25 VA. J. INT'L L. 249 (1984) (analyzing the
decision in Graco).
38. See In re Anschuetz & Co., 754 F.2d 602, 606 (5th Cir. 1985), petition for
cert. filed sub. nom. Anschuetz & Co. v. Mississippi River Bridge Auth., 106 S. Ct. 52
(1985).
39. See Philadelphia Gear Corp. v. American Pfauter Corp., 100 F.R.D. 50, 61
(E.D. Pa. 1983) (stating that "of course in the event that such efforts prove futile,
further resort may be sought from this court").
40. See Schroeder v. Lufthansa German Airlines, 18 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,222, 17,
224 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (reasoning that mandatory reference to Convention procedures is
consistent with our "principles of jurisdiction and due process" and satisfies the needs
of international comity).
41. See Struve, Discovery From Foreign Parties in Civil Cases Before U.S. Courts,
16 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1101, 1111 (1984) (comparing relative speed and effi-
ciency of F.R.C.P. procedures); International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v.




ery.42 A related consideration, cost to the litigants, is also frequently
mentioned. 43 As with the first factor, courts favoring use of the Con-
vention deemphasize this consideration.
The third factor courts consider is the probability that resort to the
Convention produces the desired information." Courts weighing this
factor often refer to article 23 of the Convention .4 Article 23 allows
the signatory state to refuse to execute letters of request for obtaining
common law style document discovery. 46 This factor became important
as the use of Convention procedures increased and some requests for
evidence were denied. 47
42. See International Soe'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 105 F.R.D. 435,
450 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (stating "the significance of this consideration is enhanced by the
pendency of this litigation for nine years."); see also Murphy v. Reifenhauser K.G.
Maschinenfabrik, 101 F.R.D. 360, 365 (D. Vt. 1984) (holding that the United States
plaintiff need not follow the Convention when the Vest German manufacturer had
already answered two sets of interrogatories without raising the Convention issue).
43. See Pain v. United States Technology Corp., 637 F.2d 775, 790 (D.C. Cir.
1980) (stating that "regardless of whether or not foreign evidence would be fully avail-
able were trial to be conducted here, there can be little doubt that the cost to the
litigants of employing such procedures would be exceedingly high."); Pierburg GmbH
& Co. K.G. v. Superior Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d 238, 241, 186 Cal. Rptr. 876, 878
(1982) (noting that cost of translating 315 interrogatories into German is prohibitively
high); Doyle, Taking Evidence Abroad by Deposition and Letters Rogatory and Ob-
tamining Documents in Foreign Territory, A.B.A. SECTION OF INT'L & Co.Mp. L. PRO-
CEEDINGS 37, 46-49 (1959) (discussing expenses and problems with interpreters, court
reporters, witnesses, and local counsel abroad).
[T]he taking of evidence abroad in the face of determined opposition can be a
long, expensive and difficult process, and both counsel and his client should care-
fully weigh the benefits and alternatives before proceeding. If, for example, the
desired witness is a party or would be subject to subpoena in the United States,
or would appear voluntarily anywhere, it would, in most instances, be preferable
to proceed with discovery in the normal course under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure before invoking the Convention.
Platto, Taking Evidence Abroad for Use in Civil Cases in the United States - A Practi-
cal Guide, 16 INr'L LAw. 575, 576 (1982).
44. See Oxman, supra note 33, at 782 (stating that the reluctant party should not
be required to use those procedures if they prove futile); Murphy v. Reifenhauser K.G.
Maschinenfabrik, 101 F.R.D. 360, 361 (D. Vt. 1984) (stating that the Convention's
"most glaring fault" is Article 23); see also Wilson v. Lufthansa German Airlines, 107
A.D.2d 393, 395-96, 489 N.Y.S.2d 575, 577 (1985) (characterizing required use of the
Convention as "an exercise in futility" because Germany had specifically stated its
intent not to execute letters of request issued to obtain pretrial discovery).
45. Convention, supra note 2, at art. 23.
46. See Radvan, supra note 21, at 1042-46 (discussing article 23 of the Conven-
tion); B. RisTAu, supra note 7, at 235-51 (discussing foreign court interpretations of a
party's declarations under article 23).
47. See Comment, Mandatory Procedures, supra note 24, at 1464 (discussing re-
sponses to requests). There is the additional concern that foreign parties will "hide
behind" the Convention. See supra notes 37-40 (discussing how federal courts retain
jurisdiction upon failure of a party to comply in discovery), infra note 90 (concerning
delays in litigation), 154-57, and accompanying text (discussing deliberate production
avoidance).
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The fourth factor courts examine is the physical location of the evi-
dence."8 If the evidence is located in this country, even if it is in the
possession of a foreign party, all courts view the evidence as clearly
outside the scope of the Convention. 49 Some courts require use of Con-
vention procedures if the evidence is physically located abroad.50 Most
courts, however, state that the mere fact evidence is located abroad is
insufficient to require use of the Convention to obtain that evidence. 1
The fifth factor courts rely on is location of the discovery processes.
Courts favoring use of Convention procedures assume that a discovery
order issued in the United States for evidence located abroad results in
discovery actually taking place in a foreign country.52 The predominant
view, however, is that despite the evidence's physical location abroad,
actual discovery takes place in the United States. As the court in Graco
stated:
This court believes that discovery does not "take place within (a state's) borders"
merely because documents to be produced somewhere else are located there.
Similarly, discovery should be considered taking place here, not in another coun-
try, when interrogatories are served here, even if the necessary information is
located in the other country. The court's view is the same with respect to people
residing in another country. 3
Courts, favoring limited applicability of the Convention, widely em-
ploy the sixth factor, status as a person or party. The basic premise is
that non-party foreigners, unlike parties, are not subject to the personal
48. See Philadelphia Gear Corp. v. American Pfauter Corp., 100 F.R.D. 58, 61(E.D. Pa. 1983) (documents in West Germany); General Electric Co. v. North Star
Int'l, Inc., No. 83 C 0838 (N.D. Iii. Feb. 21, 1984) (LEXIS, Genfed library) (all
documents located abroad).
49. See Renfield Corp. v. E. Remy Martin & Co., 98 F.R.D. 442, 444 (D. Del.
1982) (holding that the Hague Evidence Convention is not applicable to documents
located in the United States).
50. General Electric Co. v. North Star Int'l, Inc., No. 83 C 0838, slip op. at 8
(N.D. Ill. Feb. 21, 1983) (LEXIS, Genfed library).
The nationality of the party from whom discovery is requested was also a factor
considered in some of the earlier cases. See Schroeder v. Lufthansa German Airlines,
18 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,222 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (considering party's nationality as key
factor); Pierburg GmbH & Co. K.G. v. Superior Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d 238, 242,
186 Cal. Rptr. 876, 881 (1982) (ruling applicability of the Hague Convention not lim-
ited to discovery taken abroad; key factor is the nationality of the party from which the
discovery is being sought). This position, however, has been sharply criticized and no
recent decision cites it as a factor. Graco, Inc. v. Kremlin, Inc., 101 F.R.D. 503, 518-19
(N.D. Ill. 1984).
51. See Cooper Industries, Inc. v. British Aerospace, Inc., 102 F.R.D. 918, 920
(S.D.N.Y. 1984) (stating that the fact that evidence is located abroad does not bar
discovery through the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
52. General Electric Co. v. North Star Int'l, Inc., No. 83 C 0838, slip op. at 8
(N.D. 11. 1984).
53. Graco, Inc. v. Kremlin, Inc., 101 F.R.D. 503, 521 (N.D. I11. 1984).
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jurisdiction of United States courts." If the non-party foreigner resides
in a civil state, any attempt to obtain discovery violates that state's
judicial sovereignty. Therefore, that state can properly expect the Con-
vention's protection. Those courts favoring use of Convention proce-
dures point out that the Convention makes no distinction between per-
sons and parties.55 This distinction, however, did exist in practice
before the Convention. The two principal situations requiring the use of
letters rogatory did not involve a party before the court.o
The seventh, and often crucial factor, is whether use of the Conven-
tion advances the policy of international comity.? Courts receptive to
ordering primary resort to the Convention cite comity, both judicial
comity as well as the more general comity regarding respect among
nations, as the principle justification for their holding."" Courts that are
adverse to ordering use of the Convention either ignore or circumscribe
comity. 59
The eighth and final factor, related to preservation of comity, is the
scope of the discovery ordered. Some courts suggest that the broader
54. Id. at 519-20; Amicus Brief of the Federal Republic of Germany, In re An-
schuetz & Co., 754 F.2d 602 (5th Cir.), petition for cert. filed sub. nom. Anschuetz &
Co. v. Mississippi River Bridge Auth., 106 S. Ct. 52 (1985) [hereinafter FRG Amicus
Brief].
55. FRG Amicus Brief, supra note 54, at 4-6.
56. See International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 105 F.R.D. 435, 445
(S.D.N.Y. 1984) (discussing the use of letters rogatory).
57. See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895) (offering the classic definition of
comity). The Court stated:
Comity, in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one
hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, on the other. But it is the recognition
which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial
acts of another nation, having due regard both to international duty and conve-
nience, and to the rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are under the
protection of its laws.
Id. at 163-64; see also Laker Airways v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d
909, 937 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (defining comity); Volkswagenwerk v. Superior Court, 123
Cal. App. 3d 840, 857, 176 Cal. Rptr. 874, 884 (1981) (discussing the considerations
of comity in context of discovery).
58. Volkswagenwerk A.G. v. Superior Court, 123 Cal. App. 3d 787, 186 Cal. Rptr.
876, 884 (1981) (requiring first resort to the Convention because of comity concerns
and not treaty interpretations); see Vincent v. Ateliers de la Motobecane, 193 N.J.
Super. 716, 721, 475 A.2d 686, 690 (1984) (use of proper diplomatic channels impor-
tant to maintaining fair relations); Philadelphia Gear Corp. v. American Pfauter Corp.,
100 F.R.D. 58, 61 (comity requires initial use of Convention procedures for discovering
documents in West Germany).
59. McLaughlin v. Fellows Gear Shaper Co., 102 F.R.D. 956, 958-59 (E.D. Pa.
1984) (ignoring comity considerations completely); see Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Brit-
ish Aerospace, Inc., 102 F.R.D. 918, 921 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (comity considerations do
not require use of the Convention even where documents are located in Great Britain);
International Soe'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 105 F.R.D. 435, 450
(S.D.N.Y. 1984) (comity considerations relatively inapposite).
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the discovery request, the more likely the intrusion into foreign judicial
sovereignty.60 Most courts have not explicitly weighed scope as a fac-
tor,8' however, it may precipitate substantial litigation.62
II. FACTS OF IN RE ANSCHUETZ
On February 3, 1979, a Spanish vessel, the M/V POLA DE LENA,
struck a landing on the Mississippi River in New Orleans, Louisiana,
damaging the landing and two ferry boats.63 The firm Naviera Santa
Catalina owned the vessel and had chartered it to Compania Gijonesa
de Navegacion S.A. (Gijonesa)." On February 6, 1979, the owner of
the damaged landing, the Mississippi River Bridge Authority, brought
suit against Gijonesa and two unnamed foreign insurance companies"
in Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. 0
Gijonesa added Anschuetz & Co., GmbH, as a third party defendant
to the suit on July 9, 1980.6' The third party complaint alleged product
liability against Anschuetz, the manufacturer of the M/V POLA DE
LENA's failed steering device.68
Following the termination of several jurisdictional questions, all par-
ties actively participated in discovery. Beginning with Gijonesa's first
attempt to serve Anschuetz with discovery requests in October 1983,
and continuing until to the Fifth Circuit's final decision on March 7,
60. In re Anschuetz & Co., 754 F.2d 602, 608 (5th Cir.), petition for cert. filed
sub. nom. Anschuetz & Co. v. Mississippi River Bridge Auth., 106 S. Ct. 52 (1985).
61. See Murphy v. Reifenhauser K.G. Maschinenfabrik, 101 F.R.D. 360, 363 (D.
Vt. 1984). The court in Murphy stated:
The United States has a clear interest in facilitating the manner in which foreign
citizens doing business in the United States are available for litigation here.
West Germany has a clear interest in protecting the integrity of its judicial
rights and procedures, but we find that interest less compelling in this instance
than, for example, where a non-party witness is sought for deposition or where
the scope of discovery sought involves more intrusive methods.
Id.
62. See In re Anschuetz & Co., 754 F.2d 602, 608 (5th Cir.), petition for cert.filed sub. nom. Anschuetz & Co. v. Mississippi River Bridge Auth., 106 S. Ct. 52
(1985) (holding that "[i]f the discovery sought ... in Germany becomes particularly
intrusive ... then the court may order resort to the Convention") (emphasis added).
63. Petitioner's Brief, supra note 28, at 3.
64. These two companies have since merged. In re Anschuetz & Co., 754 F.2d 602,
604 n.2 (5th Cir.), petition for cert. filed sub. nom. Anschuetz & Co. v. Mississippi
River Bridge Auth., 106 S. Ct. 52 (1985).
65. Petitioner's Brief, supra note 28, at 3. The suit was later joined by two con-
struction companies doing work on the landing at the time of the accident. Id.
66. Petitioner's Brief, supra note 28, at 3. Jurisdiction of the court was invoked
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1983) (admiralty and maritime jurisdiction).
67. Respondent's Brief at 1, Anschuetz & Co. v. Mississippi River Bridge Auth.,
petition for cert. filed, 106 S. Ct. 52 (1985).
68. FRG Amicus Brief, supra note 54, at 20.
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1985, Anschuetz made numerous attempts to stifle production under
the court's discovery orders. 9 After Gijonesa failed under a production
order to procure sufficient information regarding the type, design, and
maintenance of the M/V POLA DE LENA steering system, 0 it at-
tempted to employ a Rule 30(b)(6) telephone deposition to identify
those Anschuetz personnel who would have knowledge of the location,
type, and number of pertinent documents.71 Responding to this at-
tempt, Anschuetz filed a motion to quash the telephone deposition. 72
The district court dismissed this motion on January 25, 1984.3
Soon after the district court ruling, both Anschuetz and Gijonesa
filed opposing motions regarding the conduct and scope of the ongoing
discovery, thereby sharpening the production disagreement."" Subse-
quently, on February 22, 1984, the United States magistrate denied
Anschuetz's motion for a Rule 26(c) protective order and ordered An-
69. Petitioner's Brief, supra note 28, at 3. The initial question resolved by the dis-
trict court was whether sufficient personal contacts existed to allow the court personal
jurisdiction over Anschuetz pursuant to Louisiana's long arm statute. LA. REv. STAT.
Ann. § 13.3201 (West Supp. 1986) (stating that in essence a court may exercise per-
sonal jurisdiction over a nonresident who causes damage either through his or his
agent's action or omission taking place within the state or through his action or omis-
sion occurring outside the state with which he has iufficient contact or could have rea-
sonably foreseen that his manufactured product might very well have found its way
therein). The court eventually ruled that Anschuetz was subject to its jurisdiction. In re
Anschuetz & Co., 754 F.2d 602, 604 (5th Cir.), petition for cert. filed sub. nom. An-
schuetz & Co. v. Mississippi River Bridge Auth., 106 S. Ct. 52 (1985).
A two year battle then ensued regarding whether the Spanish shipyard, Empressa
Nacional De Bazan, which Anschuetz sought to bring in as another third party defend-
ant, was subject to the court's jurisdiction. Id. at 605. Ultimately, the court ruled it did
not have personal jurisdiction. Id.
70. See Respondent's Brief, supra note 67, at 1 (describing pretrial discovery). The
exact date of these requests is October 12, 1983. Most, if not all, of the requested
information was located in the Federal Republic of Germany. Amicus Brief of the
United States at 3, In re Anschuetz & Co., 754 F.2d 602, 608 (5th Cir.), petition for
cert. filed sub. nom. Anschuetz & Co. v. Mississippi River Bridge Auth., 106 S. Ct. 52
(1985) [hereinafter U.S. Amicus Brief].
71. Respondent's Brief, supra note 67, at 1-2.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 3-4.
74. In re Anschuetz & Co., 754 F.2d 602, 608 (5th Cir.), petition for cert. filed
sub. nom. Anschuetz & Co. v. Mississippi River Bridge Auth., 106 S. Ct. 52 (1985).
Anschuetz also argued that Gijonesa was asking for "another bite at the apple" as it
had the opportunity to depose Anschuetz personnel in Spain in 1981. Id. The Fifth
Circuit apparently believed this was a general Rule 26(c) motion. Id. at 1-2. In the
interim, on January 20, Gijonesa served Anschuetz with interrogatories requesting the
identification of the Anschuetz organization during the period 1976-79. Id. at 3. The
District Court dismissed the motion as moot because Anschuetz and Gijonesa had en-
tered into a discovery agreement. The agreement called for Gijonesa to limit the scope
of the document requests (rendering the Rule 30(b)(6) telephone requests unnecessary)
and for Anschuetz to designate a corporate representative and other witnesses deposed
in Germany. Id.
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schuetz to comply with most of Gijonesa's discovery requests."5
By April 1984, Anschuetz's attempts to quash production took a dif-
ferent track, relying for the first time76 on the Hague Evidence Conven-
tion. On or about April 13, Anschuetz's motions and appeals77 to vari-
ous judicial bodies based on the Convention were denied.7 8 The Fifth
75. Respondent's Brief, supra note 67, at 2. Gijonesa again was dissatisfied with
Anschuetz' compliance with the court's orders and filed a motion requesting sanctions.
Id. at 2-3. On March 23, 1984, the Magistrate granted the motion and ordered An-
schuetz to pay the expense to have a Gijonesa attorney travel to Germany to take
preliminary depositions of the Anschuetz employees to determine if they had knowl-
edge of the suit's subject matter. Id. On March 30, 1984, Anschuetz filed a motion to
reconsider its request for a protective order of February 21, 1984 which was denied. Id.
at 3-4.
76. See id. (stating that the March 30 motion obliquely raised the Convention as a
defense).
77. Id. at 3-4. On or about April 13, 1984, Anschuetz (1) moved for a protective
order to stay the depositions, then scheduled to take place in Germany on May 2, 1984;(2) appealed to the district court the magistrate's orders that documents be produced
and that depositions not be stayed; and (3) sought to amend the document production
and deposition orders to permit interlocutory review by the Fifth Circuit pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1292(b). The motions were denied. Id.
78. Id. In its decision the district court stated:
We have a party, we have a jurisdiction, and under Rule 34 a party is required
to produce documents which are in its possession, custody or control. I don't
think there is any doubt but that Anschuetz' documents involved in this matter
are under its control. The fact that the documents are in West Germany is, to
this Court, immaterial. The Court has jurisdiction over Anschuetz. Anschuetz
can produce the documents in the United States, and be subject to our discovery
provisions. The treaty was not designed to create a Chinese wall among nations.
It was designed to facilitate the securing of evidence among various nations, giv-
ing due deference to the various differences which exist within their judicial sys-
tems. The Court does not believe that it's mandatory, nor does the Court even
believe that it's applicable where the Court had in personam jurisdiction over a
non-party defendant insofar as Rule 34 is concerned, and insofar as Rule
30(b)(6) is concerned. I'm frank to say that, in the event that a deposition was
required from a non-30(b)(6) witness, the treaty would have to be applied in
order to secure that deposition testimony, if indeed the deposition testimony was
to be taken. Or if I were to send, or any court send, a commission, that would be
subject to the provisions of the rule; or if letters rogatory were sent to someone
not a party, or to some person who is an agent of a party, but who might have in
his personal possession, as opposed to its corporate possession, some relevant doc-
ument, I think the Court would have to proceed on the basis of the treaty to
secure these. But to say that the combination of Rule 5, which permits the ser-
vice of motions and discovery motions and so forth on counsel of record, Rule 34,
which requires a party to produce records which are in his possession, custody or
control, subject, of course, to protective order of the Court, or Rule 30(b)(6)
which requires that a private corporation who is a party designate one or more
officers, directors or managing agents to testify, and to permit them to testify
pursuant to the discovery provisions, are all subject to the Hague Convention, to
this Court make no sense at all.
The Court has personal jurisdiction over Anschuetz. The Court intends to en-
force the provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as to this party over
which it has jurisdiction to the same extent that it would enforce those rules
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Circuit, however, decided to hear the dispute and granted Anschuetz a
writ of mandamus. 79 Its decision was issued March 7, 1985.80 The Su-
preme Court subsequently granted a writ of certiorari."'
III. ANALYSIS OF THE FIFTH CIRCUIT'S OPINION
In In re Anschuetz, 82 the Fifth Circuit held that discovery of a party
must take place under the Hague Evidence Convention8 only with the
taking of an involuntary deposition conducted in a signatory country.
Use of the Convention is also required when persons, not parties sub-
ject to the court's in personam jurisdiction, are ordered to produce doc-
uments or other evidence in a signatory state." Through this holding
the Fifth Circuit established three principles. First, the Hague Conven-
tion procedures are not exclusive when a United States court has per-
sonal jurisdiction. 5 Second, production constitutes discovery taken in
the United States, and, accordingly, foreign judicial sovereignty is not
violated when documents are ordered produced in the United States8
Third, considerations of international comity do not require mandatory
first resort to the Convention beyond the two situations specified by the
court.8 7
against any party over which it has jurisdiction. The motion, accordingly, will,
therefore be denied on that ground.
Transcript of the April 13, 1984 Hearing, at 8, reprinted in Petitioner's Brief, supra
note 28, at 32a-34a.
79. In re Anschuetz & Co., 754 F.2d 602, 614 (5th Cir.), petition for cert. filed
sub. nom. Anschuetz & Co. v. Mississippi River Bridge Auth., 106 S. Ct. 52 (1985).
80. Id. at 605.
81. Id. at 614.
82. Id. at 615.
83. Id. The court seemed to indicate extraordinary discovery requests, those that
are "particularly intrusive," may constitute a third situation warranting the Conven-
tion's use. Id. The court in Anschuetz, however, was clear that this situation "does not
mandate the Convention's use, it would merely afford the court the option to order the
parties to conduct discovery under the Hague Convention." Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 611. But see Oxman, supra note 33, at 741-44 (stating that the concern
is not legal but proprietary and that the better view would recognize the sensitive na-
ture of international order where multiple concurrent jurisdictions are involved).
86. In re Anschuetz & Co., 754 F.2d 602, 611 (5th Cir.), petition for cert. filed
sub. nom. Anschuetz & Co. v. Mississippi River Bridge Auth., 106 S. Ct. 52 (1985).
But see Pierburg GmbH & Co. K.G. v. Superior Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d 238, 245,
186 Cal. Rptr. 876, 881 (1982) (arguing that Convention procedures are not limited to
discovery taken abroad).
87. See Rosenthal, Jurisdictional Conflicts Between Sovereign Nations, 19 INT'L
LAw. 487, 495 (1985) (principles of comity require serious deliberation and should
carry significant weight with United States courts). Contra Oxman, supra note 33, at
761 (advocating use).
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A. THE HAGUE CONVENTION IS NOT EXCLUSIVE
The court in Anschuetz was concerned with the inequities resulting
from exclusive use of the Convention. 8 The court believed exclusivity
would be unfair because it gives foreign litigants an advantage over
American litigants. Foreign litigants employ the full range of discovery
devices available under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure while
United States litigants would be limited to using the more restrictive
procedures required by the Convention. 9 The court further stated that
exclusive use encourages adversaries to conceal information. 0
This argument minimizes the fact that the critical factor is the locus
of the evidence, not the nationality of the parties.9 If the evidence is
located abroad, every litigant, not just United States citizens, may be
restricted from using the broad discovery provisions under the Federal
Rules.92
In Anschuetz the court also stated that requiring exclusive use of
Convention procedures would "work a drastic and very costly change"
in the conduct of litigation.93 The court noted litigation involving na-
88. In re Anschuetz & Co., 754 F.2d 602, 606-07 (5th Cir.), petition for cert. filed
sub. nom. Anschuetz & Co. v. Mississippi River Bridge Auth., 106 S. Ct. 52 (1985).
The court asserted that the United States has an interest in "facilitating the manner in
which foreign citizens doing business in the United States are available for litigation."
Id. at 609 (quoting Murphy v. Reifenhauser K.G. Maschinenfabrik, 101 F.R.D. 360,
363 (D. Vt. 1984)).
89. Id. at 606-07.
90. Id. This would be "a result directly antithetical to the express goals of the
Federal Rules and the Hague Convention which aim to encourage the flow of informa-
tion between adversaries." Id. at 606; see Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 500-02
(1947) (stating that because mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts is essential to
proper litigation, discovery rules are to be construed broadly to allow information gath-
ering). The basic assumption of this argument, that a litigant will violate United States
law, is highly suspect.
91. Oxman, supra note 33, at 783.
92. Id. Oxman notes that "[A] foreign plaintiff trying to secure evidence from a
foreign branch of an American defendant might well be required . . . to use the Con-
vention procedures." Id. Likewise, the California Supreme Court made it clear that
two parties seeking the same discovery are not treated differently:
[E]qual protection arguments apply only where persons who are similarly situ-
ated receive disparate treatment. Here, plaintiffs and defendant are not so situ-
ated[.] Should defendant seek answers to written interrogatories from its co-de-
fendants, who are also West German nationals, and those co-defendants assert
the applicability of the Hague Evidence Convention, then Pierburg would be
treated in the identical manner as plaintiffs must now be treated. This state may
not, and does not, treat two parties seeking the same discovery differently.
Pierburg GmbH & Co. K.G. v. Superior Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d 238, 246, 186 Cal.
Rptr. 876, 882 (1982).
93. In re Anschuetz & Co., 754 F.2d 602, 612 (5th Cir.), petition for cert. filed
sub. nom. Anschuetz & Co. v. Mississippi River Bridge Auth., 106 S. Ct. 52
(1985)(citing Graco, Inc. v. Kremlin, Inc., 101 F.R.D. 503, 521 (N.D. 11. 1984)).
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tionals of signatory states is increasing, thereby magnifying this
problem."
While the court is correct in recognizing that use of Convention pro-
cedures is more costly than resort to domestic rules of procedure, it
ignores the power of United States courts to distribute costs among,
and impose time limits upon, the litigants. 5 Moreover, not only are the
new procedures a vast overall improvement on pre-Convention proce-
dures,9" but they specifically require a more expeditious treatment of
requests.9 Finally, delays attributable to the Convention's use will be
reduced through familiarity and improved judicial relations. 8
After reviewing the applicable Federal Rules on taking evidence
abroad, the court considered the numerous exceptions to the foreign
state's obligation to execute letters of request. 0 The court explained
that these exceptions effectively swallow the rule because they "poten-
tially bar a letter of request from being successfully executed at all."100
While exceptions do exist, the court's use of the modifier "numer-
ous' "1°1 is inappropriate. Phillip Amram, rapporteur at the Convention
Accord Struve, Discovery From Foreign Parties in Civil Cases Before US. Courts, 16
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1101, 1111 (1984) (stating that the Hague Convention
procedures are significantly more costly than those under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure).
94. In re Anschuetz & Co., 754 F.2d 602, 612 (5th Cir.), petition for cert. filed
sub. nom. Anschuetz & Co. v. Mississippi River Bridge Auth., 106 S. Ct. 52 (1985);
Work v. Bier, 106 F.R.D. 45, 53 n.12 (D.D.C. 1985) (quoting Anschuetz).
95. FED. R. Civ. P. 26; see In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation, 105
F.R.D. 577, 580-81 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (multidistrict litigation).
96. See generally Augustine, supra note 24 (comparing the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and the Hague Evidence Convention Procedures and ultimately recom-
mending use of the Convention as the best mechanism for obtaining evidence located in
ratifying countries).
97. See Convention, supra note 2, at art. 9 (stating that letters of request "shall be
executed expeditiously").
98. Oxman, supra note 33, at 734 n.3 (stating that American attorneys' and for-
eign judges' lack of familiarity with Convention procedures and the judicial processes
of the other country often is a major factor in delaying completion of foreign discovery)
Of course, with time and accumulated experience the delays will be significantly re-
duced. Id.
99. In re Anschuetz & Co., 754 F.2d 602, 609-10 (5th Cir.), petition for cert.filed
sub. nom. Anschuetz & Co. v. Mississippi River Bridge Auth., 106 S. Ct. 52 (1985).
The Hague Evidence Convention provides:
In executing a Letter of Request the requested authority shall apply the appro-
priate measures of compulsion in the instances and to the same extent as are
provided by its internal law for the execution of orders issued by the authorities
of its own country or of requests made by parties in internal proceedings.
Convention, supra note 2, at art. 10.
100. In re Anschuetz & Co., 754 F.2d 602, 609-10 (5th Cir.), petition for cert.
filed sub. nom. Anschuetz & Co. v. Mississippi River Bridge Auth., 106 S. Ct. 52
(1985).
101. Id. at 610.
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and United States representative on the Special Commission that
drafted the Convention, emphasized that use of the phrase "shall apply
. ..compulsion '"102 was intended to be circumvented only where the
foreign state's sovereignty would be violated.1"3 Indeed, preventing vio-
lations of state sovereignty was a major concern of the Convention. 0 4
The Fifth Circuit cited article 23 of the Convention,'0 5 which pro-
vides for refusal of letters of request in common law style discovery, 0
as preventing successful employment of Convention procedures. 0 7 De-
spite the court's many assertions, including the incorrect statement that
all signatories to the Convention adopted the reservation'0 8 in article
23,109 article 23 has not prevented discovery from taking place." 0
Additionally, the court in Anschuetz stated that even if discovery
abroad is available, use of the Convention would limit the "breadth of
evidence" usually forthcoming under our rules of discovery."' In sup-
port, the court listed several differences between our common law sys-
102. Convention, supra note 2, at art. 10.
103. Amram, supra note 18, at 652, 53. Article 12 of the Convention states "The
execution of a letter of request may be refused only to the extent that. . .(b) the state
addressed considers that its sovereignty or security would be prejudiced thereby." Con-
vention, supra note 2, at art. 12. Therefore, a state may not refuse to execute a letter of
request solely on the ground that under its internal law the state of execution claims
exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action, or that its internal law
would not admit a right of action on it. Id.
104. Amram, supra note 18, at 652.
105. Convention, supra note 2, at art. 23.
106. In re Anschuetz & Co., 754 F.2d 602, 610 n.21 (5th Cir.), petition for cert.
filed sub. nom. Anschuetz & Co. v. Mississippi River Bridge Auth., 106 S. Ct. 52
(1985); see Report on the Work of the Special Commission on the Operation of the
Convention of 18 March 1970 on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commer-
cial Matters, reprinted in 17 I.L.M. 1425, 1427-28 (1978) (implying that pretrial dis-
covery in the United States can occur before a legal proceeding has been initiated).
107. In re Anschuetz & Co., 754 F.2d 602, 607-12 (5th Cir.), petition for cert.
filed sub. nom. Anschuetz & Co. v. Mississippi River Bridge Auth., 106 S. Ct. 52
(1985) (stating that one of its difficulties with using the Convention exclusively is Arti-
cle 23) (citing Murphy v. Reifenhauser K.G. Maschinefabrik, 101 F.R.D. 360, 361 (D.
Vt. 1984)).
108. A reservation is a statement by a party to an international treaty revealing an
intent to comply or not comply with a particular treaty provision. See Vienna Conven-
tion on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, U.N. Doc. A/
CONF.39/27, reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969) (establishing the legal effects of, and
objections to, reservations).
109. See Radvan, supra note 21, at 1042 (noting Israel and Czechoslovakia have
not adopted the reservation). It should be remembered that a state may drop reserva-
tions at will. Convention, supra note 2, at art. 34.
110. See FRG Amicus Brief, supra note 54, at 10-13 (describing West German
cooperation with numerous pretrial discovery requests).
111. In re Anschuetz & Co., 754 F.2d 602, 611 (5th Cir.), petition for cert. filed
sub. nom. Anschuetz & Co. v. Mississippi River Bridge Auth., 106 S. Ct. 52 (1985).
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tem and the civil law judicial system for taking evidence abroad.112
Once again, the court's conclusion is suspect. Provisions in the Conven-
tion allow transmitting courts to request that certain procedures, such
as those used by United States courts, be employed in the execution of
letters of request.113
Additionally, the court expressed concern with the effects on United
States courts of requiring the Convention's exclusive use.1 4 The court
considered it "patently obvious" that requiring use of Convention pro-
cedures would cause the forum court to relinquish control over conduct
of the discovery process, raising the specter of "very serious interfer-
ence with the jurisdiction of United States courts." 1 This fear is not
entirely well founded. Use of the Convention necessarily entails em-
ploying the good offices of a foreign court.110 This was also true of pre-
Convention letters rogatory.117 Trust in the foreign court's good faith
efforts to execute properly the letter of request will dissipate these con-
cerns and foster increased international judicial cooperation. 1' 8
The court also stated that the Convention's permissive language ren-
ders Convention procedures nonexclusive1 because the Convention's
112. Id. The court argued that "the foreign state's own procedures might foreclose
or limit cross examination, full participation by counsel might not be allowed, or a
verbatim record might not result, thus limiting admissibility of the testimony in an
American court." See id. (citing Borell & Boyd, Opportunities for and Obstacles to
Obtaining Evidence for Use in Litigation in the United States: in France, 13 INr'L
LAw. 35, 40-41 (1979)); Carter, Obtaining Foreign Discovery and Evidence for Use in
Litigation in the United States: Existing Rules and Procedures, 13 INT'L LAw. 5, 15
(1979).
113. Convention, supra note 2, at art. 9; see infra note 183 (describing West Ger-
man intent to comply with Convention Procedures).
114. In re Anschuetz & Co., 754 F.2d 602, 612 (5th Cir.), petition for cert. filed
sub. nom. Anschuetz & Co. v. Mississippi River Bridge Auth., 106 S. Ct. 52 (1985).
115. See id. (citing Graco, Inc. v. Kremlin, Inc., 101 F.R.D. 503 (N.D. I11. 1984)).
The Court reasoned that "treating the Convention procedures as exclusive would make
foreign authorities the final arbiters of what evidence may be taken from their nation-
als." Id. See generally Comment, Mandatory Procedures, supra note 23 (discussing
interference with the jurisdiction of United States courts).
116. See Convention, supra note 2, at art. 12 (noting that execution of a letter of
request may be refused if the execution does not fall within the functions of the execut-
ing states' judiciary, or the recipient state believes execution would prejudice its sover-
eignty or security.)
117. See supra note 15 (describing the procedure for letters rogatory).
118. See Comment, Mandatory Procedures, supra note 23, at 1464 (discussing the
responses of several states to requests under the Hague Evidence Convention); Amicus
Brief of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
at 17-19, Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. District Court, 782 F.2d 120
(8th Cir.), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 2888 (1986) [hereinafter U.K. Amicus Briefi
(stating a foreign state's willingness to assist United States courts generally should be
considered in determining proper resort to the Convention).
119. In re Anschuetz & Co., 754 F.2d 602, 608 n.1 I (5th Cir.), petition for cert.
filed sub. nom. Anschuetz & Co. v. Mississippi River Bridge Auth., 106 S. Ct. 52
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language emphasizes cooperation, not mandatory procedures.1 0 Fur-
thermore, the court reviewed the Convention's legislative history and
determined that the parties intended that the Convention's language
was permissive. 121 The court doubted whether the United States dele-
gation, the State Department, or Congress intended exclusive use of the
Convention. 22
The Fifth Circuit's analysis of this issue is sound. A review of all
available materials on the history of the Convention and the United
States delegation indicates no United States intent to require exclusive
use of the Convention.' 23 Despite this, however, civil law countries may
have intended exclusivity. 124 Because Great Britain, another common
law state, proposed the inclusion of article 23125 in the Convention126 at
the time the Convention was drafted, the civil law countries may not
have realized that they agreed to assist United States litigants' con-
ducting United States style discovery.' 27 Given American refusal to
employ Convention procedures, it is arguable that the Convention was
a document founded on a fundamental misunderstanding and therefore
destined to be discarded.
The court distinguished cases requiring use of Convention procedures
in a variety of ways.' 28 Federal cases were dismissed because they re-
(1985). The Court properly refused to use the language of article 27 in arriving at this
conclusion. Id. There is support for using article 27. Lasky v. Continental Products
Corp., 569 F. Supp. 1227, 1228 (E.D. Pa. 1983). The better view, however, is that
article 27 refers to what a receiving court may use. Amram, supra note 18, at 107;
Comment, Mandatory Procedures, supra note 23, at 1477.
120. In re Anschuetz & Co., 754 F.2d 602, 613 (5th Cir.), petition for cert. filed
sub. nom. Anschuetz & Co. v. Mississippi River Bridge Auth., 106 S. Ct. 52 (1985).
121. Id. at 613 n.28.
122. Id. at 615 (citing Oxman, supra note 33, at 760).
123. See Oxman, supra note 33 at 758-61 (discussing the numerous sources).
124. See Edwards, Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters,
18 INT'L. COMP. L. Q. 646, 650-51 (1969) (describing the failure of civil law con-
tracting states to appreciate British concerns with United States style discovery as a
root cause of problems associated with exclusivity).
125. Convention, supra note 2, at art. 23.
126. In re Anschuetz & Co., 754 F.2d 602, 610 n.21 (5th Cir.), petition for cert.
filed sub. nom. Anschuetz & Co. v. Mississippi River Bridge Auth., 106 S. Ct. 52
(1985); Mandatory Procedures, supra note 23, at 464 n.8.
127. Id. The Federal Republic has repeatedly expressed its view that the Conven-
tion was, and is, exclusive. FRG Amicus Brief, supra note 54, at 5-9. The French
Senate, angered by United States litigants' disregard for Convention procedures, made
it a criminal offense to request or transmit certain evidence for use in a foreign pro-
ceeding in a matter unauthorized by the Hague Convention. See Herzog, The 1980
French Law on Documents and Information, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 382 (1981) [hereinaf-
ter Herzog] (describing French measures to limit the abuse of extraterritorial applica-
tion of United States law). Therefore, it may be inferred that France also intended
Convention procedures to be mandatory.
128. Volkswagenwerk, A.G. v. Superior Court, 123 Cal. App. 3d 840, 176 Cal.
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lied too heavily on the two California Court of Appeals' cases, Voks-
wagenwerk and Pierburg.129 The state cases were found "not to be well
reasoned" because they were decided by state courts that, in general,
are more inclined to yield to a federal treaty over state rules of civil
procedure.130 Also, the scope of discovery ordered in these cases was
very broad.13' Accordingly, the state courts were too concerned with
intruding on foreign sovereignty. 32
The court's analysis of these prior cases is incomplete.13 3 Additional
consideration is required as to why these courts, particularly the federal
courts, ordered first resort to the Convention. 3 A more thorough ex-
amination reveals a strident concern with enhancing international judi-
cial comity.' 35
B. DISCOVERY ORDERED PRODUCED HERE TAKES PLACE HERE
The Fifth Circuit unequivocally proclaimed that discovery ordered
produced in the United States does not violate the Convention's intent
to protect judicial sovereignty. 13 The court embraced the familiar ad-
age that a party does not need physical control of documents to have
them accessed through pretrial discovery.137 The court then advanced
the notion that matters preparatory to producing documents or answer-
ing interrogatories in this country, even if they take place in a foreign
country, do not constitute discovery in that foreign state.lm
The court grounds this argument in the belief that acts not calling
Rptr. 874 (1981); Pierburg GmbH & Co. v. Superior Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d 238,
186 Cal. Rptr. 876 (1982).
129. In re Anschuetz & Co., 754 F.2d 602, 606 (5th Cir.), petition for cert. filed
sub. nora. Anschuetz & Co. v. Mississippi River Bridge Auth., 106 S. Ct. 52 (1985)
(citing Volkswagenwerk, A.G. v. Superior Court, 123 Cal. App. 3d 840, 176 Cal. Rptr.
847 (1981) and Pierburg GmbH Co. v. Superior Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d 238, 186
Cal. Rptr. 876 (1982)).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 608-09.
133. Id.
134. See generally Oxman, supra note 33, at 779-95 (arguing that a careful bal-
ancing of interests which resulted in a determination that first resort, while reserving
the right to ultimately employ the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, best satisfied all
interests).
135. See supra notes 24, 33, 40, 57-61, 87 and accompanying text (discussing com-
ity as an important judicial consideration).
136. In re Anschuetz & Co., 754 F.2d 602, 607 (5th Cir.), petition for cert. filed
sub. nom. Anschuetz & Co. v. Mississippi River Bridge Auth., 106 S. Ct. 52 (1985).
137. See id. (citing Cooper Industries v. British Aerospace, 102 F.R.D. 918, 919
(S.D.N.Y. 1984)).
138. See id. at 611 (citing Adidas (Canada) Ltd. v. S/S Sea Train Bennington, 80
Civ. 1 911 (S.D.N.Y. May 30, 1984)).
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for German judicial participation do not implicate the Hague Conven-
tion. 139 Therefore, if the Convention is not implicated, then resorting to
its procedures is never required. 140 The same logic is applied to the
taking of voluntary depositions."" Using the term "preparatory" to de-
scribe a party's compliance with a discovery order is often not truly
descriptive of the degree of work done within the foreign state. 42 Often
a considerable portion of requested documents is located abroad. The
same is true of witnesses.1 43 As a result, there is a serious danger of
implicating foreign sovereignty. 4
C. CONSIDERATIONS OF COMITY Do NOT REQUIRE USE OF THE
CONVENTION IN THE FIRST INSTANCE
Holding that the Convention is not exclusive, and then defining nar-
rowly what constitutes discovery taken abroad, the court in Anschuetz
then examined comity considerations as a potential reason for ordering
first resort to Convention procedures. The court stated that United
States courts necessarily retain jurisdiction even when they order initial
resort to Convention procedures. Therefore, if the receiving court does
not execute the letter of request to the United States sending court's
satisfaction, then the sending court may nonetheless order the foreign
party to produce under the Federal Rules.145 The court noted that ig-
139. Id.
140. Id. The specious logic of this statement is alluring and subsequent court deci-
sions heavily rely on it. See In re Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale, 782 F.2d
120 (8th Cir.), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 2888 (1986) (declaring that since French
judicial participation is not required, the Hague Convention does not apply); Wilson v.
Lufthansa German Airlines, 489 N.Y.S. 2d 575, 577-78, 108 A.2d 393, 395-96 (1985)
(holding that the information demanded does not impinge upon German sovereignty
because it involved documents rather than a personal appearance or inspection).
141. See In re Anschuetz & Co., 754 F.2d 602, 611 n.25 (5th Cir.), petition for
cert. filed sub. nom. Anschuetz & Co. v. Mississippi River Bridge Auth., 106 S. Ct. 52
(1985) (declaring that the "logic of this position seems equally compelling with respect
to people residing in another country").
142. See Philadelphia Gear Corp. v. American Pfauter Corp., 101 F.R.D. 58 (E.D.
Pa. 1983) (stating explicitly that because most documents were located in Germany,
first resort to the Convention was necessary).
143. See id. General Electric Co. v. North Star Int'l, No. 83 C 0838, slip op. (N.D.
Ill. 1983) (stating that all needed documents are located in Germany).
144. In re Anschuetz & Co., 754 F.2d 602, 613 (5th Cir.), petition for cert. filed
sub. nom. Anschuetz & Co. v. Mississippi River Bridge Auth., 106 S. Ct. 52 (1985);
see FRG Amicus Brief, supra note 52, at 8 (claiming that taking oral depositions in
Germany would violate German sovereignty).
145. See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text (stating that the district court
retains authority to order further discovery under the Federal Rules if foreign authori-
ties fail to fully cooperate in gathering the necessary evidence); Schroeder v. Lufthansa
German Airlines, 18 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,222, 17,222-23 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (holding that
the sanctions and rules of the district court may be imposed if requests made pursuant
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noring the receiving court's refusal to execute the letter of request
would result in "the greatest insult to a civil law country." 40 There-
fore, the court concluded that the interests of comity dictate that first
resort to the Convention is not desirable.14
The court's conclusion contradicts the view of the Federal Republic
of Germany that given the opportunity the Convention will prove a
workable and satisfying means of gathering evidence. 48 The court's
view also contradicts common sense. Civil law states would obviously
prefer first resort to the Convention rather than no resort at all.149 Fur-
thermore, even if resort to Convention procedures proves unsuccessful,
the Federal Rules allow judges to distribute the added costs of discov-
ery and to effectively deal with the added delays.'1 0
Finally, the court held that trial courts should consider comity where
relevant, however, it did not detail the kind of comity analysis re-
quired.151 As a result, trial courts are left to consider this problem on
their own.
IV. EFFECTS OF THE ANSCHUETZ DECISION AND A
PROPOSAL FOR CHANGE
A. EFFECTS OF THE DECISION
Every court deciding this issue, including the Eighth and Ninth Cir-
cuits, has adopted the Fifth Circuit's holding in Anschuetz.152 For the
to the Convention are not satisfactorily fulfilled).
146. In re Anschuetz & Co., 754 F.2d 602, 613 (5th Cir.), petition for cert. filed
sub. nom. Anschuetz & Co. v. Mississippi River Bridge Auth., 106 S. Ct. 52 (1985)
(concluding that when United States courts only seek a foreign country's judicial coop-
eration as a mere formality before resorting to the Federal Rules, they offend the for-
eign authorities); Schroeder v. Lufthansa German Airlines, 18 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,223,
17,224-25 (holding that the court may apply its own Rules if foreign authorities do not
adequately comply with requests for evidence). Such second guessing of foreign author-
ities by United States courts is highly offensive. Id.
147. In re Anschuetz & Co., 754 F.2d 602, 613 (5th Cir.), petition for cert. filed
sub. nom. Anschuetz & Co. v. Mississippi River Bridge Auth., 106 S. Ct. 52 (1985).
148. FRG Amicus Brief, supra note 54, at 7.
149. Id. at 12-14.
150. Id. at 12-13.
151. In re Anschuetz & Co., 754 F.2d 602, 614-15 (5th Cir.), petition for cert.
filed sub. nom. Anschuetz & Co. v. Mississippi River Bridge Auth., 106 S. Ct. 52
(1985). In a subsequent decision, the court addressed this issue more fully. See In re
Messerschmidt Bolkow Blohm, 757 F.2d 729 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct.
1633 (1986) (holding that while district courts should consider international comity
when making discovery orders, the full range of sanctions permitted under the Federal
Rules are still applicable at the court's discretion).
152. See Lowrance v. Weinig, 107 F.R.D. 386, 388-89 (W.D. Tenn. 1985) (holding
in a products liability action that the essential determination was whether discovery
occurred within Germany); Work v. Bier, 106 F.R.D. 45, 55-56 (D.D.C. 1985) (ruling
1987]
AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
following reasons, this trend is likely to continue. Courts will circum-
vent the Convention because of their familiarity with, and greater cer-
tainty of, their own procedures.153 Moreover, courts today are very sen-
sitive to added delays in litigation,'" and any means that expedite
pretrial discovery are welcomed."5 Further, courts appear to believe
that foreign corporate defendants use the Convention as a tool to
weaken their opponents.156 As it is often described, foreign defendants
"seek to avoid producing documents" through interposition of the
Hague Convention.1 57
The Fifth Circuit's light dismissal of comity considerations in An-
schuetz has resulted in encouraging courts to neglect the effect that
circumvention of Convention procedures will have on foreign sover-
eignty and international judicial comity. 5" In civil states taking evi-
that the use of Convention procedures was not required by international comity where
inordinate delay would result); Testerion Inc. v. Skoog, No. 4-84-911, slip op. (D.
Minn. Aug. 9, 1985) (LEXIS, Genfed file, District file) (holding in a contract suit that
once in personam jurisdiction exists, discovery may proceed under the Federal Rules);
Wilson v. Lufthansa German Airlines, 108 A.D.2d 393, 395, 489 N.Y.S.2d 575, 578
(1985) (holding in a products liability action that resort to the Convention was not
required by a comity analysis despite location of the evidence in Germany); Gebr.
Eickoft Maschinenfabrik und Eisengieberei v. Starcher, 328 S.E.2d 492, 501 n.13, 504-
06 (W.Va. 1986) (comity considerations do not require use of the Evidence Convention
on German nationals).
The Eighth Circuit was faced with the interplay of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, the Convention and a French blocking statute. In re Societe Nationale Indus-
trielle Aeorspatiale, 782 F.2d 120, 124-45 (8th Cir.), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 2888
(1986) (adopting the Fifth Circuit's view that unless the discovery actually takes place
in France, the Convention is not applicable and international comity need not be
considered).
The Ninth Circuit also adopted the holding in Anschuetz. Societe Nationale Indus-
trielle Aerospatiale, 788 F.2d 1408, 1410-11 (9th Cir. 1986) (ruling that the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, and not the Hague Evidence Convention, govern discovery of
documents from foreign parties).
153. See generally Oxman, supra note 33 (stating that a court's familiarity with
local rules and its close relationship with the local bar causes it to often unilaterally
circumvent the Convention in favor of the more familiar rules).
154. See FED. R. Civ. P. 1 (mandating that the Rules of Civil Procedure be inter-
preted to secure a just, speedy, inexpensive resolution to each action).
155. Wilson v. Lufthansa German Airlines, 108 A.D.2d 393, 395, 489 N.Y.S.2d
575, 578 (1985) (indicating that a court will consider the costly and cumbersome na-
ture of the Convention machinery in dealing with the problem of exclusivity).
156. In re Anschuetz & Co., 754 F.2d 602, 614 (5th Cir.), petition for cert. filed
sub. nora. Anschuetz & Co. v. Mississippi River Bridge Auth., 106 S. Ct. 52 (1985).
The court stated "[i]t does not require Prometheus (sic) to foresee that United States
litigants [read plaintiffs] would soon find it impossible to obtain necessary discovery
from foreign based parties." Id.
157. Id. at 612-14; Lowrance v. Weinig, 107 F.R.D. 386, 388-89 (W.D. Tenn.
1985).
158. Lowrance v. Weinig, 107 F.R.D. 386, 389 (W.D. Tenn. 1985) (describing how
the Anschuetz court's failure to thoroughly examine German sovereign interests and
the effects of non-resort on international comity have encouraged other courts to ignore
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dence is a judicial function reserved solely for trial judges.6 0 There-
fore, the sovereign interests of a civil state are implicated because their
citizens are compelled to perform judicial acts within their territory.
Nevertheless, United States courts have summarily concluded that be-
cause all discovery in their cases was to occur in the United States, no
analysis of international comity need be made.60 Courts reached this
conclusion despite the fact that documents being sought were located
abroad and those who would respond to the interrogatories were foreign
nationals living in their respective countries. 16 1
The effect of the Anschuetz decision on international judicial comity
may prove significant. United States litigants abroad may be negatively
affected, 62 and United States government attempts to protect sensitive
economic and military technology may become more difficult.16 3 Con-
sidered together with signatory civil states' severe restrictions regarding
our discovery procedures, this decision may reduce the number of par-
ties to the Convention and ultimately result in a return to the use of
letters rogatory with the extensive concomitant difficulties for
litigants.'"
B. ORDERING FIRST RESORT IS OFTEN THE BETTER ALTERNATIVE
The decision in Anschuetz will result in little or no use of Hague
Evidence Convention procedures. This is an unfortunate result because
of the efficiency and cost advantages the Convention affords to all par-
ties. Additionally, use of the Convention avoids many unfortunate in-
stances involving affronts to foreign judicial comity.
There are two ways to breathe life back into the Hague Evidence
Convention. First, require exclusive resort to the Convention where the
receiving state makes the Convention the sole means to gather evidence
for use in an extraterritorial judicial proceeding.16 5 To discern which
parties adopted the position requires reference to the exceptions and
the effects of their refusal to employ Convention procedures).
159. Herzog, supra note 127, at 383-84.
160. Lowrance v. Weinig, 107 F.R.D. 386, 388-89 (W.D. Tenn. 1985).
161. See B. RiSTAU, supra note 7, at 257-59 (discussing who may take evidence in
civil law countries).
162. See Oxman, supra note 33, at 786 (stating that the resentment and animosity
of foreign nations resulting from their coerced acceptance of the violation of judicial
sovereignty may have adverse effects on United States litigants in foreign courts).
163. Id. at 769 n.99.
164. See supra note 16 and accompanying text (detailing the complicated processes
of letters rogatory).
165. B. RiSTAU, supra note 7, at 253-56.
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conditions found within the body of the Evidence Convention.1 0 Be-
cause these exceptions and conditions are expressly allowable under the
Convention, they are presumptively a treaty obligation.167 Arguably, as
a matter of constitutional law, this approach is necessary' 68 because a
treaty "obligation" becomes part of the "supreme law of the land." '
To its advantage this solution avoids the use of the highly indefinite
principle of comity 17 0 and therefore aids in avoiding international judi-
cial animosity.
This approach, however, ignores the clearly expressed intent of the
United States that the Convention is not the only means for United
States courts to order discovery abroad .'7  This argument, therefore,
imposes on United States courts an interpretation of the Convention in
direct contradiction to that expressed by the United States delega-
tion, ' the United States State Department, 7 3 the President, 74 and
Congress. 75
A second solution to the conflict of interest problems inherent in
these cases is to require United States courts to employ Convention
procedures as a first resort in circumstances where sovereign judicial
interests are strongly implicated. 76 These situations are those instances
where; (1) the preponderance of documents sought are located in the
foreign state;177 (2) the persons sought to be deposed, or respond to
166. See generally Convention, supra note 2.
167. U.S. CONST. art. IV, cl. 2. The privileges and immunities clause states that
"each state shall accord to the citizens of each and every other state those privileges
and immunities which it accords to its own citizens." id.
168. B. RISTAU, supra note 7, at 253-56.
169. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 230-31 (1942).
170. See supra notes 24, 33, 40, 57-61, 87, 135 and accompanying text (discussing
international comity as a judicial consideration).
171. See U.S. Ratification, supra note 15, at 105 (stating that the Convention
would effect "no major changes in United States procedure [nor require] changes in
United Stites Legislation or Rules").
172. See 1969 Report of the U.S. Delegation, supra note 22 at 820 (stating that no
major changes in United States procedure and practice would be necessary).
173. See Letter of Submittal, supra note 18 at 324-35 (stating that no major
changes are necessary in United States procedure).
174. See Message From the President, supra note 19 (adopting position that no
changes in United States procedure are necessary); Amicus Brief of the United States
at 11-19, Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. District Court, 782 F.2d 120,
124-25 (8th Cir.), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 2888 (1986) (No. 85-0695) (stating that
comity never requires use of the Convention).
175. See Letter of Submittal, supra note 18 (discussing the need for the Conven-
tion and the fact that no changes in United States law were necessary to adopt).
176. See Oxman, supra note 33, at 781 (agreeing with the practice of California
courts to compel litigants to first attempt discovery in conformity with the Convention).
177. Id. at 779-80; see also U.K. Amicus Brief, supra note 116, at 16-17 (discuss-
ing physical location as a consideration).
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interrogatories, are foreign nationals of the signatory state residing in
that state;1"8 (3) the foreign party has insubstantial contacts with the
forum,179 or, if a corporation, no substantial corporate personnel in the
forum.180 Other considerations include the length of time elapsed since
commencement of the suit,18' the desire and ability of the parties to
share costs, 82 and the track record of the receiving state; (a) in acting
on the request;'1 3 (b) in fully responding to the request;184 and, (c) in
responding expeditiously. 8 5
This solution would satisfy the interests of foreign governments,18
but not cause unfair delay or expenses to litigants before American
courts.87 Because United States courts retain their jurisdictional pre-
rogatives, subsequent resort to the Federal Rules for discovery will en-
sure the full and fair exchange of information.18 3
To ensure maximum compliance with a letter of request, attorneys
178. Oxman, supra note 33, at 779-80; U.K. Amicus Brief, supra note 118, at 12-
14.
179. Id.
180. Oxman, supra note 33, at 779-80.
181. Comment, Mandatory Procedures, supra note 23, at 614.
182. Id. at 614-15.
183. FRG Amicus Brief, supra note 54, at 13-14. The Federal Republic of Ger-
many has stated that:
a) its courts are guided by a spirit of cooperation when executing requests for
judicial assistance under the Convention;
b) it interprets requests literally without insisting on strict compliance with
formalities;
c) it permits the taking of voluntary testimony before U.S. consular officers and
diplomats;
d) it permits the production of documents to be used at trial;
e) it allows the examination of witnesses relating to documents; and
f) it has in connection with this brief expressed its intention to consider the prac-
tical experience gained so far and to be gained in the future, in connection with
the promulgation of regulations for pre-trial production of documents.
Id.
184. See FRG Amicus Brief, supra note 54, at 5-7 (discussing compliance by Fed-
eral Republic of Germany); U.K. Amicus Brief, supra note 118, at 17-19 (discussing
foreign state's willingness to assist United States courts as a favorable indication that
the Convention should be employed).
185. Id.; see infra notes 95-98 and accompanying text (discussing expeditious use
of the Evidence Convention).
186. FRG Amicus Brief, supra note 54, at 5-6; U.K. Amicus Brief, supra note 118,
at 17-18.
187. See generally Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947); American Tel. & Tel.
Co. v. Grady, 594 F.2d 594, 596 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied sub. nom. American Tel.
& Tel. Co. v. MCI Communications Corp., 440 U.S. 971 (1979).
188. See FRG Amicus Brief, supra note 54, at 5-6 (inferring that foreign courts
will honor letters of request for evidence which will not be used at trial); see supra
notes 114-18 and accompanying text (discussing jurisdiction of federal and state
courts).
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should draft requests for assistance that are as specific as possible. 180
Such specificity will avoid allegations that the requests are not designed
to produce evidence actually for trial and minimize foreign displeasure
with "pretrial discovery."' 190 Requests should also state that the evi-
dence is being sought for use in an ongoing judicial proceeding.,," Fi-
nally, judges should strictly scrutinize these requests to ensure maxi-
mum probability of execution.'92
CONCLUSION
The decision in Anschuetz inadequately considered foreign sovereign
judicial interests. Further analysis of these interests would have in-
volved the Fifth Circuit in a more reasoned approach to the conflicts of
interest inherent in use of the Hague Evidence Convention. Requiring
exclusive use of the Convention in all cases involving foreign signatory
nationals is not the answer to these conflicts. Requiring courts to un-
dertake a reasoned evaluation of comity in each case, however, would
result in harmonizing these various conflicting interests.
Thomas John Percy
189. Augustine, supra note 24, at 126.
190. Id.
191. Id. Presumably this will clarify the judicial need for the requested
information.
192. See Oxman, supra note 33, at 778 n.130 (discussing recent amendments to
Rule 26(k) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizing greater judicial involve-
ment in pretrial discovery). As in entirely domestic litigation, increased judicial super-
vision of discovery in international litigation recognizes that the litigants will at times
exceed the reasonable bounds of permitted discovery. Id.
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